Suchergebnisse

AbstractThis contribution will tackle a central question for the architecture of fundamental rights protection in the EU: can we envision a Charter that fully applies to the Member States, even beyond the limits of its scope of application? To improve our understanding of the boundaries of the Charter and the potential for further expansion, I will examine the legal avenues through which the CJEU has extended the scope of application of EU fundamental rights in fields of state powers. While the latent pull of citizenship towards a more expansive application of the Charter has not been fully realized, the principle of effective judicial protection (Article 19(1) TEU) has recently shown potential for protection under EU law beyond the boundaries of the Charter. As will be argued, effective judicial protection may well become a doorway for full application of the Charter to the Member States. While such an outcome might currently seem politically unsound, I contend that a progressive case-by-case expansion of the applicability of the Charter to the Member States would be welcome from the standpoint of a robust notion of the rule of law in the EU.

In Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, the CJEU seized the occasion to uphold the principle of judicial independence as a primary obligation for the Member States under the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU. This newly crafted interpretation of Article 19(1) has crystallized in Commission v. Poland, in which the CJEU declared that the reform of the Polish law on the Supreme Court lowering the retirement age of judges breached the obligation to respect judicial independence. The goal of this piece is to assess the bold interpretation given to the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) as a building block of the EU's constitutional order. First, the expansion of the substantive content of Article 19(1) TEU will be analysed. How did the CJEU justify the shift from an obligation to establish a system of remedies ensuring effective judicial review to an obligation of respect for judicial independence? Second, the scope of this obligation and its potential reach will be critically examined. I will argue that Article 19(1) TEU may actually trigger the application of the Charter. Eventually, Article 19(1) TEU has the potential to become an open door for enforcing the Charter against the States regardless of its limited scope of application.

En el marco establecido por la Constitución española y los Estatutos
de Autonomía, el Estado social se articula en gran medida a través del
Estado autonómico. El objetivo de este trabajo es determinar en qué medida y a
través de qué instrumentos la jurisprudencia constitucional ha avalado una tendencia
a la centralización del poder y homogeneización normativa en el contexto
de la crisis económica, de tal modo que se opere un rediseño del orden competencial
en perjuicio del principio de autonomía y la capacidad de las Comunidades
Autónomas de desarrollar políticas sociales. Este análisis se basará en
dos casos de estudio: el derecho a la protección de la salud y la vivienda digna.
En ambos ámbitos materiales, por un lado, el Estado central ha adoptado legislación
en respuesta a la crisis, y por el otro las Comunidades Autónomas han
desarrollado políticas diversas en ejercicio de sus competencias propias. Como
consecuencia, se ha producido un elevado grado de conflictividad constitucional
en un contexto en el que se entrelazan diversos ejes: autonomía política, igualdad
y Estado social en el marco de la crisis económica.
Espainiako Konstituzioak eta autonomia-estatutuek zedarritzen
duten esparruan, estatu soziala, neurri handi batean, estatu autonomikoaren
bidez josten da. Artikulu honen bidez, ikusi eta erakutsi nahiko nuke konstituzio-
jurisprudentziak zenbateraino eta zer tresna erabiliz jo duen balekotzat krisi
ekonomikoak iraun duen bitartean boterea zentralizatzeko eta arauak homogeneizatzeko
egon den joera; azkenean, eskumenen antolamendua beste era batera
diseinatu baita, autonomia-printzipioaren kaltetan eta autonomia-erkidegoek
gizarte-politikak garatzeko duten ahalmenaren kaltetan. Oinarri modura, bi kasu
aztertuko ditut: osasuna babesteko eskubidea, eta etxebizitza duina. Bai arlo batean
zein bestean, alde batetik, estatuak lege batzuk sortu ditu krisiari erantzuteko;
eta, bestetik, autonomia-erkidegoek zenbait politika garatu dituzte, beren
eskumenak baliatuz. Ondorioz, liskar asko piztu da konstituzioaren inguruan, sokatik
hainbat norabidetan tira egiten denean bezala: autonomia politikoa, berdintasuna
eta estatu soziala, eta, gainera, krisialdi ekonomikoan.
Within the framework set by the Spanish Constitution and the
Statutes of Autonomy, the social state is developed to a great extent through
the autonomic state. The goal of this work is to understand the extent to which
and through what mechanisms the constitutional case-law has endorsed the
trend towards the centralization of power and normative homogenization in the
context of the economic crisis, in such a way that the allocation of powers has
been redesigned to undermine the principle of autonomy and the capacity of the
Autonomous Communities to develop social policies. This analysis will focus on two case studies: the right to health and to housing. In both fields, on the one
hand, the central state has adopted legislation in response to the crisis, and on
the other the Autonomous Communities have developed diverse policies in the
exercise of their respective powers. As a consequence, constitutional conflicts
have increased in a context in which several core elements are intertwined:
political autonomy, equality and the social state in the framework of the
economic crisis.

El objeto de este trabajo es realizar una valoración crítica de la STC 235/2007, de 7 de noviembre, que resuelve la cuestión de inconstitucionalidad planteada por la Audiencia Provincial de Barcelona sobre el artículo 607.2 CP. El Tribunal Constitucional (TC) declara inconstitucional la cláusula que
prohíbe la negación del genocidio por vulneración de la libertad de expresión y reinterpreta la cláusula que prohíbe la justificación. En primer lugar, se exponen los antecedentes de este tipo penal y la crítica doctrinal sobre el mismo. A continuación, se analiza la argumentación del TC sobre el alcance de la libertad de expresión en relación con la tipificación de la difusión de ideas negadoras o justificadoras del genocidio, para después proceder a su valoración. El objetivo es poner de manifiesto las inconsistencias de orden interno, derivadas de la propia argumentación del TC, y externo, derivadas de su contraposición con la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos (TEDH) y el ordenamiento de la Unión Europea (UE). Se sugiere una propuesta de reconstrucción que contribuya a una mejor comprensión del pronunciamiento del TC y de sus implicaciones desde la doctrina de la «sobreinclusión»
Konstituzio Epaitegiak azaroaren 7an emandako 235/2007 ebazpenaren balorazio kritikoa egitea da azterlan honen helburua. Hain justu, ebazpen horren bidez, 607.2 CP artikulua zela-eta Bartzelonako Probintzia Auzitegiak jarritako inkonstituzionaltasun-auzia ebazten du Konstituzio Epaitegiak, eta inkonstituzionaltzat jotzen du genozidioa ukatzea debekatzen duen klausula, adierazpen-askatasuna urratzen duelako; eta, halaber, justifikazioa debekatzen duen klausula berrinterpretatzen du. Lan honetan, lehenik eta behin, tipo penal horren aurrekariak azalduko ditugu, bai eta horri buruzko kritika doktrinala egin ere. Ondoren, genozidioa ukatu edo justifikatzen duten ideiak hedatzearen tipifikazioa dela-eta Konstituzio Epaitegiak adierazpen-askatasunaren irispenari buruz emandako argudioak aztertuko ditugu, eta, jarraian, baloratu. Izan ere, lan honek ebazpenaren ilauntasunak agerian utzi nahi ditu, bai barrukoak, Konstituzio Epaitegiak emandako argudioenak, bai kanpokoak, argudio horiek Giza Eskubideen Europako Epaitegiaren jurisprudentziarekin eta Europar Batasuneko ordenamenduarekin bat ez etortzeak eragindakoak. Azkenik, berregituratze-proposamen bat iradokitzen da lan honetan, Konstituzio Epaitegiaren adierazpena bera nahiz horrek «gain-inklusioa» deritzon doktrinaren ikuspegitik dituen inplikazioak hobeto ulertzen laguntzeko.
The aim of this work is to critically assess the Constitutional Court decision (STC 235/2007, November 7th) responding to the question raised by the Audiencia Provincial (Barcelona) regarding article 607.2 Criminal Code. The Constitutional Court declared that the clause prohibiting the denial of genocide was unconstitutional because this prohibition impinged upon free speech. The Court also gave a restrictive interpretation of the clause prohibiting the justification of genocide. The first section examines the background of article 607.2 and its doctrinal critique. The next section analyzes the Court¿s reasoning about the scope of protection of free speech with regard to disseminating ideas denying or justifying crimes of genocide. The following sections are devoted to the critical evaluation of the Constitutional Court decision. The goal is to show internal inconsistencies, arising from the reasoning of the Court itself, and external inconsistencies, arising from the opposition to the European Court of Justice case-law, and the EU law. A reconstructive approach will be suggested to contribute to a better understanding of the Court decision and its implications from the perspective of the overbreadth doctrine.

In Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, the CJEU seized the occasion to uphold the principle of judicial independence as a primary obligation for the Member States under the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU. This newly crafted interpretation of Article 19(1) has crystallized in Commission v. Poland, in which the CJEU declared that the reform of the Polish law on the Supreme Court lowering the retirement age of judges breached the obligation to respect judicial independence. The goal of this piece is to assess the bold interpretation given to the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) as a building block of the EU's constitutional order. First, the expansion of the substantive content of Article 19(1) TEU will be analysed. How did the CJEU justify the shift from an obligation to establish a system of remedies ensuring effective judicial review to an obligation of respect for judicial independence? Second, the scope of this obligation and its potential reach will be critically examined. I will argue that Article 19(1) TEU may actually trigger the application of the Charter. Eventually, Article 19(1) TEU has the potential to become an open door for enforcing the Charter against the States regardless of its limited scope of application. ; Financed by DER2017-84195-P.

The goal of this article is to develop an analytical framework for the conceptualization of international judicial independence. First, it will be argued that judicial independence is not to be conceived as an end in itself but rather as a condition for the legitimacy of international courts (ICs). Also, independence is not a monolithic concept, but one of degree and the optimal degree of independence might vary according to the function and type of ICs. Second, I will provide a taxonomy of judicial independence in the international sphere and identify and systematize the relevant actors and variables. While studies about international judicial independence tend to focus on the mechanisms available to state governments, this work will take into account a broader set of actors and variables. Finally, a notion of interdependence will be advanced as a framework for institutional design that combines the need to enable adjudication free from undue influence or pressure with mechanisms to counterbalance judicial power. Forms of interdependence on the grounds of the principles of accountability and checks and balances might contribute to the overall legitimacy of ICs.

"This thought-provoking book examines the state of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and its shortcomings in terms of social rights protection in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and the aftermath of the Euro crisis. Providing a critical analysis of the basic tenets of European economic governance, it highlights current challenges for a Social Europe and proposes new avenues for tackling these issues. Focusing on the existing mechanisms of social rights protection in the EU, chapters explore the imbalance between economic and social goals within the EMU, discussing how to strengthen the building blocks of Social Europe in order to address this. The book also investigates the challenges for the adjudication of social rights before European and domestic courts, and considers alternative models of judicial review that offer better protection in the context of crisis. Scholars and students of EU law, constitutional law, and public international law will find this book a crucial read, in particular those with an interest in law and economics. It will also be useful for EU law practitioners working in social rights."--

"This thought-provoking book examines the state of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and its shortcomings in terms of social rights protection in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and the aftermath of the Euro crisis. Providing a critical analysis of the basic tenets of European economic governance, it highlights current challenges for a Social Europe and proposes new avenues for tackling these issues. Focusing on the existing mechanisms of social rights protection in the EU, chapters explore the imbalance between economic and social goals within the EMU, discussing how to strengthen the building blocks of Social Europe in order to address this. The book also investigates the challenges for the adjudication of social rights before European and domestic courts, and considers alternative models of judicial review that offer better protection in the context of crisis. Scholars and students of EU law, constitutional law, and public international law will find this book a crucial read, in particular those with an interest in law and economics. It will also be useful for EU law practitioners working in social rights."--